In this article, we present the optimal strategy for public plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging services with multiple charging options: fast charging service and slow charging service. The PEV user make decisions by firstly considering the remaining energy, travel distance to charging station, then about the charging prices, charging rates and estimated charging time. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider both monopoly and duopoly markets, where the two services are operated by a single service provider (SP) and two different SPs, respectively. For the monopoly market, we propose a three-stage Stackelberg game model. For the duopoly market, we propose a two-stage Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. We provided the SP’s optimal pricing strategies and decisions in the monopoly market, and the optimal pricing contract and quantity contract for SPs in the duopoly market with Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. Both the analytical and simulation results show that, in the monopoly market, offering two charging options can potentially improve the SP’s profit compared with offering one option only in the monopoly market; while in the duopoly market, it is optimal for SPs to offer the quantity contract rather than the price contract to maximize profits.

中文翻译：

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具有多种充电选项的插电式电动汽车充电：服务提供商定价策略的系统分析

在本文中，我们提出了具有多种充电选项的公共插电式电动汽车（PEV）充电服务的最佳策略：快速充电服务和慢速充电服务。PEV用户首先要考虑剩余能量，到充电站的行驶距离，然后再考虑充电价格，充电率和估计的充电时间来做出决定。为了获得对这种高度耦合的系统的见解，我们考虑了垄断市场和双头垄断市场，这两种服务分别由一个服务提供商（SP）和两个不同的SP运营。对于垄断市场，我们提出了一个三阶段的Stackelberg博弈模型。对于双头垄断市场，我们建议进行两阶段的Bertrand竞争和Cournot竞争。我们提供了SP在垄断市场中的最佳定价策略和决策，以及在Bertrand竞争和Cournot竞争的双寡头市场中SP的最佳定价合同和数量合同。分析和模拟结果均显示，在垄断市场中，与仅在垄断市场中提供一种选择相比，提供两种收费选项可以潜在地提高SP的利润。在双头垄断市场中，SP最好提供数量合同而不是价格合同以最大化利润。