This article will contest the claim made by many ecological psychologists that affordances are invariantly the objects of perception. First of all, the lack of agreement concerning what affordances actually are, what their true nature is, is considerable. Second, the metaphysico-ontological debate has obscured the important misunderstanding consisting in conceiving of affordances as ecological objects or entities of any kind. Third, an appropriate analysis of the notion of affordance will show that this concept is not primarily devoted to perception, and believing that it is has unnecessarily impoverished what we (can) see in our environment. From a Wittgensteinian and an ethnomethodological approach, to make sense of the relation between ourselves and our environments we should use only those concepts available to us, and the internal relation between our everyday concepts and the way we invoke them in practice will be shown. No theory of meaning is needed here.

本文将与许多生态心理学家提出的主张相提并论，即承受能力始终是感知的对象。首先，对于实际的能力是什么，其真正的本质缺乏共识。其次，形而上学-本体论的争论掩盖了重要的误解，即把可承受的费用想象成任何形式的生态客体或实体。第三，对负担概念的适当分析将表明，该概念并非主要用于感知，并且认为它不必要地使我们（可以）在环境中看到的东西变得贫穷。从维特根斯坦主义和民族方法学的角度出发，要理解我们自己与环境之间的关系，我们应该仅使用对我们可用的那些概念，并且将展示我们日常概念与我们在实践中调用它们的方式之间的内部关系。这里不需要意义理论。