In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament since the restoration of the Spanish democracy. The classic simple games do not fit with the particular voting rule that it is used to invest the president of the regional government. In order to model this voting mechanism we incorporate coalitional externalities to the game. We use the extensions of the most popular power indices to games with externalities that have been proposed in the most recent literature. Moreover, we propose a method to estimate the probability of a given coalition based on the ideological positions of its members in a two-dimensional political spectrum.

中文翻译：

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使用外部游戏在巴斯克议会中进行权力分配

在本文中，我们研究了自西班牙民主制度恢复以来在巴斯克议会中的权力分配。经典的简单游戏与用于投资地区政府总裁的特定投票规则不符。为了模拟这种投票机制，我们将联盟的外部性纳入了游戏。我们使用最流行的力量指数来扩展最近文献中提出的具有外部性的游戏。此外，我们提出了一种基于给定联盟在二维政治频谱中成员的意识形态立场来估计其可能性的方法。