This paper introduces a receiver who perceives ambiguity in a binary model of Bayesian persuasion. The sender has a well-defined prior, while the receiver considers an interval of priors and maximizes a convex combination of worst and best expected payoffs (\(\alpha \)-maxmin preferences). We characterize the sender’s optimal signal and find that the receiver’s payoff differences across states given each action (sensitivities), play a fundamental role in the characterization and the comparative statics. If the sender’s preferred action is the least (most) sensitive one, then the sender’s equilibrium payoff, as well as the sender’s preferred degree of receiver ambiguity, is increasing (decreasing) in the receiver’s pessimism. We document a tendency for ambiguity-sensitive receivers to be more difficult to persuade.

本文介绍了一种在贝叶斯说服力的二元模型中感知歧义的接收者。发送方具有定义明确的先验，而接收方考虑先验间隔，并最大化最差和最佳预期收益的凸组合（\（\ alpha \）-maxmin首选项）。我们表征发送者的最佳信号，发现在给定每个动作（灵敏度）的情况下，接收者在各状态之间的收益差异在表征和比较静态中起着根本性的作用。如果发送方的首选行为是最不敏感（最敏感）的行为，则发送方的均衡收益以及发送方对接收方歧义的首选程度会增加（减少）接收方的悲观情绪。我们记录了一种趋势，即对歧义敏感的接收者更难以说服。