A substantial share of severance payments derives from private contracts or collective agreements. In this paper, we study the determination of these payments. We analyze joint bargaining over wages and severance payments in a search‐and‐matching model with risk‐averse workers. Individual bargaining results in levels of severance pay that provide full insurance, but also depend on unemployment benefits and job‐finding rates. Unions also choose full insurance. Because their higher wage demands reduce job creation, this requires higher severance pay. Severance pay observed in eight European countries, to which we calibrate the model, lies between predictions from the bargaining and union scenarios.

中文翻译：

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了解遣散费的确定：任务，讨价还价和工会*

遣散费的很大一部分来自私人合同或集体协议。在本文中，我们研究了这些付款的确定。我们在与厌恶风险的工人进行搜索和匹配的模型中，分析了工资和遣散费的联合谈判。个人讨价还价带来的遣散费水平既可以提供充分的保险，又取决于失业救济金和求职率。工会还选择全额保险。由于他们较高的工资要求会减少创造就业机会，因此需要更高的遣散费。在我们校准模型的八个欧洲国家中观察到的遣散费介于讨价还价和工会情景的预测之间。