Foreign aid flows result from agreements reached between states that need resources and other states or international organizations that can provide those resources. Recent literature has argued that different international development organizations bargain with aid-receiving states in particular ways. Specifically, some authors argue that non-egalitarian international development organizations seek to secure more gains when bargaining with economically weak states. Global Environment Facility projects are negotiated by the international agency that will implement the project, allowing us to examine this claim in the context of a set of similar development projects. Correcting and reanalyzing an existing dataset describing the composition of financing in GEF projects, we find no evidence that the financing terms provided by different GEF implementing agencies varies by the type of organization. Both egalitarian and non-egalitarian agencies provide more external funding to poorer countries. We replicate this result using data from development projects financed by the World Bank, the archetypal non-egalitarian international organization. We discuss how our results are consistent with organizational behavior that originates in the interests of an international bureaucracy oriented toward poverty alleviation.

外国援助流量是由需要资源的国家与可以提供这些资源的其他国家或国际组织之间达成的协议产生的。最近的文献认为，不同的国际发展组织以特殊的方式与受援国讨价还价。具体来说，一些作者认为，非平等的国际发展组织在与经济薄弱的国家进行讨价还价时力求获得更多的收益。全球环境基金项目是由将执行该项目的国际机构进行谈判的，这使我们能够在一系列类似的开发项目的背景下研究这一主张。纠正并重新分析描述GEF项目融资构成的现有数据集，我们没有发现证据表明不同的GEF执行机构提供的融资条件会随组织类型的不同而变化。平等机构和非平等机构都向较贫穷的国家提供更多的外部资金。我们使用原型非平等国际组织世界银行资助的开发项目中的数据来复制此​​结果。我们讨论了我们的结果如何与组织行为相一致，而组织行为源于面向扶贫的国际官僚机构的利益。