Germany’s large current account surplus has been widely criticized, especially against the backdrop of the role of macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone crisis. We argue that Germany’s resistance to reduce its massive current account surplus through an expansionary policy at home is rooted in distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, we leverage original survey data from 135 German economic interest groups, qualitative interviews with interest group representatives and policymakers, and data from public opinion surveys. We show that while there is general support for internal adjustment among German interest groups, they disagree heavily about which specific policies should be implemented to achieve this goal. Together with a broad public and elite-based consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, this polarization turns financing into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in German ordoliberal ideas or Germany’s export-oriented structure, distributive conflicts contribute significantly to Germany’s resistance to reduce its large current-account surplus. Because similar dynamics can be observed in other surplus countries, we argue that distributive struggles within surplus countries played an important role in interstate conflicts about the management of the crisis.

中文翻译：

---

我们宁愿付出，也不愿改变欧元区危机中德国不调整政策

尤其是在宏观经济失衡在欧元区危机中发挥作用的背景下，德国经常账户巨额盈余遭到了广泛批评。我们认为，德国拒绝通过本国的扩张性政策来减少巨额经常账户盈余的抵制，其根源在于对可能的调整政策的设计进行的分配斗争。为了探讨这一论点，我们利用了来自135个德国经济利益集团的原始调查数据，对利益集团代表和政策制定者的定性访谈以及民意调查的数据。我们表明，尽管德国利益集团普遍支持内部调整，但他们在实现该目标应实施哪些具体政策方面存在严重分歧。这种两极分化与避免欧元区分裂的广泛公众和基于精英的共识一起，将融资变成了具有政治吸引力的战略。分配冲突不仅仅根植于德国的公民思想或德国的出口导向结构，反而极大地促进了德国减少其经常账户盈余的抵制。因为在其他盈余国家中也可以观察到类似的动态，所以我们认为，盈余国家内部的分配斗争在危机管理的州际冲突中起着重要作用。分配冲突是德国抵制减少其大量经常账户盈余的重要原因。因为在其他盈余国家中也可以观察到类似的动态，所以我们认为，盈余国家内部的分配斗争在危机管理的州际冲突中起着重要作用。分配冲突是德国抵制减少其大量经常账户盈余的重要原因。因为在其他盈余国家中也可以观察到类似的动态，所以我们认为，盈余国家内部的分配斗争在危机管理的州际冲突中起着重要作用。