The handling of the 2008 financial crisis has reinforced the conviction that the European Union (EU) is undemocratic and that member states are forced to delegate overwhelming power to a supranational technocracy. However, European countries have engaged with this alleged power drift differently, with only a few member states demanding more parliamentary scrutiny of EU institutions. This article develops a political economy explanation for why only some states have enforced mechanisms to monitor the EU more closely. Our theory focuses on the role of the crisis and the impact of fiscal autonomy in countries outside and inside currency arrangements such as the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We argue that, in the aftermath of a severe economic shock, member states outside the EMU possess more monetary and fiscal resources to handle the crisis. These would then demand oversight of EU decision-making if their fiscal sustainability depends on the Union. By contrast, Eurozone states that need policy changes cannot address the crisis independently or initiate reforms to scrutinize the EU. Hence, we argue that during the heated moments of severe economic downturns, parliaments in Eurozone countries discuss supranational supervision rarely. As these legislatures have nevertheless to give in to the popular demand for EU control, they express support for more EU supervision in the infrequent times of debate. We provide evidence for our theory with a cross-national analysis of EU oversight institutions, and a new original dataset of parliamentary debates during the Eurozone crisis. Our findings highlight the political consequences that financial nosedives have across the diverse membership of a supranational organization.

中文翻译：

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冒着烟：金融危机和欧盟对议会监督的需求

对2008年金融危机的处理使人们更加坚信，欧洲联盟（EU）不民主，成员国被迫将压倒一切的权力下放给超国家的技术专家制。但是，欧洲国家对这种所谓的权力漂移的看法有所不同，只有少数几个成员国要求议会对欧盟机构进行更多的审查。本文提出了一个政治经济学解释，说明为什么只有一些国家实施了机制来更紧密地监视欧盟。我们的理论侧重于危机的作用以及财政自治权在货币安排内外的国家（例如欧洲经济与货币联盟（EMU））中的作用。我们认为，在严重的经济冲击之后，欧洲货币联盟以外的成员国拥有更多的货币和财政资源来应对危机。如果这些国家的财政可持续性取决于欧盟，那么它们将要求对欧盟决策进行监督。相比之下，欧元区要求需要改变政策，不能独立应对危机或发起改革以审查欧盟。因此，我们认为，在严重的经济衰退的激烈时刻，欧元区国家的议会很少讨论超国家监管。但是，由于这些立法机关不得不屈服于对欧盟管制的普遍需求，因此他们表示支持在辩论的罕见时期加强欧盟的监督。我们通过对欧盟监督机构的跨国分析以及欧元区危机期间议会辩论的新原始数据集，为我们的理论提供了证据。