In response to the euro area crisis, policymakers took a gradual, incremental approach to official lending, at first relying on the blueprint followed by the International Monetary Fund, then developing their own crisis resolution framework. We describe this process of institutional development, marked by a substantial divergence in the terms of official loans offered to. We use a unique dataset of the characteristics of the various official loans to provide key stylised facts, and use regression and event analysis techniques to study the effect of different lending terms on market borrowing costs and fiscal performance. Euro area loans, when in longer maturities and lower rates, go hand in hand with improved market access. Instead, the terms of IMF loans appear to have no significant effect on market access, but primary balances are larger when IMF maturities are longer. We discuss arguments for refocusing debt sustainability analysis and embed debt management techniques in programme design, while considering the trade-off between adjustment incentives and official lending.

中文翻译：

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欧元区危机期间的官方部门贷款

为应对欧元区危机，决策者对官方贷款采取了渐进渐进的方法，首先是依靠蓝图，然后是国际货币基金组织，然后建立自己的危机解决框架。我们描述了这一制度发展的过程，其特点是提供给官方的贷款条件存在很大差异。我们使用各种官方贷款的特征的独特数据集来提供关键的程式化事实，并使用回归和事件分析技术来研究不同贷款条款对市场借贷成本和财务绩效的影响。欧元区贷款期限较长，利率较低时，与改善的市场准入并驾齐驱。相反，IMF的贷款条款似乎对市场准入没有重大影响，但是，如果IMF的期限更长，则主要余额会更大。我们在讨论调整激励与官方贷款之间的权衡取舍时，讨论了将债务可持续性分析的重点重新放在计划设计中的问题，并在计划设计中嵌入了债务管理技术。