How do states improve their international status and prestige short of war? We argue that rejecting international assistance can boost a government’s image by making it appear self-sufficient and able to provide for its citizens, leading many states to decline foreign aid. However, potential recipients only do so when they have the ability to send a credible signal and when they value status highly. We derive these hypotheses from a formal model and then use a survey experiment to demonstrate that international observers alter their opinions about potential recipients when they learn that they rejected international aid. Finally, we gather new data to empirically verify that the more resources and greater military capabilities states possess, the more likely they are to reject aid, even when they require the aid. Our results help to explain why states refuse needed assistance and suggest that many states cultivate images of self-sufficiency.

在没有战争的情况下，国家如何提高自己的国际地位和威信？我们认为，拒绝国际援助可以提升政府形象，让政府显得自给自足并能够为其公民提供服务，从而导致许多国家拒绝外国援助。然而，潜在的接收者只有在有能力发出可信的信号并且高度重视地位时才会这样做。我们从正式模型中得出这些假设，然后使用调查实验来证明，当国际观察者得知他们拒绝国际援助时，他们会改变对潜在接受者的看法。最后，我们收集新的数据来实证证明，国家拥有的资源越多、军事能力越强，他们就越有可能拒绝援助，即使他们需要援助。我们的研究结果有助于解释为什么各国拒绝提供必要的援助，并表明许多国家树立了自给自足的形象。