We provide a robust (prior-free) strategic foundation for the Walrasian Equilibrium: mechanisms for exchange economies with asymmetric information and interdependent values that are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly effi cient, when there are many agents. The level of ineffi ciency is proportional to the sum of 1 N and the degree of value interdependence. Conversely, we show that mechanisms generating smaller effi ciency losses must violate some of the constraints. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction.

中文翻译：

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稳健的交易所机制设计

我们为瓦尔拉斯均衡提供了强大的（无先验的）战略基础：具有不对称信息和相互依存价值的交换经济机制，这些机制是事后个人理性的、激励兼容的、产生预算盈余并且事后几乎有效，当有很多代理。无效率的程度与 1 N 的总和和价值相互依赖的程度成正比。相反，我们表明产生较小效率损失的机制必须违反一些约束。可以使用新颖的歧视性条件双重拍卖来实现这些机制。