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The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
The Review of Economic Studies ( IF 5.9 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-03 , DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa041
Takuo Sugaya 1 , Alexander Wolitzky 1
Affiliation  

The communication revelation principle of mechanism design states that any outcome that can be implemented using any communication system can also be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. In multistage games, we show that in general the communication revelation principle fails for the solution concept of sequential equilibrium. However, it holds in important classes of games, including single-agent games, games with pure adverse selection, games with pure moral hazard, and a class of social learning games. For general multistage games, we establish that an outcome is implementable in sequential equilibrium if and only if it is implementable in a canonical Nash equilibrium in which players never take codominated actions. We also prove that the communication revelation principle holds for the more permissive solution concept of conditional probability perfect Bayesian equilibrium. ∗For helpful comments, we thank Dirk Bergemann, Drew Fudenberg, Dino Gerardi, Shengwu Li, George Mailath, Roger Myerson, Alessandro Pavan, Harry Pei, Ludovic Renou, Adam Szeidl, Juuso Toikka, and Bob Wilson; seminar participants at Austin, Bocconi, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Cowles, Harvard-MIT, Kobe, LSE, NYU, UPenn, Princeton, Queen Mary, Stony Brook, UCL, UCLA, and UCSD; and the anonymous referees. Daniel Clark and Hideo Suehiro read the paper carefully and gave us excellent comments. Wolitzky acknowledges financial support from the NSF and the Sloan Foundation.

中文翻译:

多阶段游戏中的启示原则

机制设计的沟通启示原则指出,任何可以使用任何沟通系统实现的结果也可以通过激励兼容的直接机制来实现。在多阶段博弈中,我们表明,一般情况下,对于序列均衡的解决方案概念,交流揭示原理是失败的。然而,它适用于重要的博弈类别,包括单智能体博弈、纯逆向选择博弈、纯道德风险博弈和一类社会学习博弈。对于一般的多阶段博弈,我们确定一个结果在顺序均衡中是可实现的,当且仅当它在规范纳什均衡中是可实现的,其中玩家从不采取共同控制的行动。我们还证明了通信揭示原理适用于条件概率完美贝叶斯均衡的更宽松的解决方案概念。∗感谢 Dirk Bergemann、Drew Fudenberg、Dino Gerardi、Shengwu Li、George Mailath、Roger Myerson、Alessandro Pavan、Harry Pei、Ludovic Renou、Adam Szeidl、Juuso Toikka 和 Bob Wilson 的有益评论;Austin、Bocconi、Collegio Carlo Alberto、Cowles、Harvard-MIT、Kobe、LSE、NYU、UPenn、Princeton、Queen Mary、Stony Brook、UCL、UCLA 和 UCSD 的研讨会参与者;和匿名裁判。Daniel Clark 和 Hideo Suehiro 仔细阅读了论文,并给了我们很好的评论。Wolitzky 感谢 NSF 和斯隆基金会的财政支持。李胜武、乔治·梅拉斯、罗杰·迈尔森、亚历山德罗·帕万、哈里·佩、卢多维奇·雷诺、亚当·塞德尔、尤索·托伊卡和鲍勃·威尔逊;Austin、Bocconi、Collegio Carlo Alberto、Cowles、Harvard-MIT、Kobe、LSE、NYU、UPenn、Princeton、Queen Mary、Stony Brook、UCL、UCLA 和 UCSD 的研讨会参与者;和匿名裁判。Daniel Clark 和 Hideo Suehiro 仔细阅读了论文,并给了我们很好的评论。Wolitzky 感谢 NSF 和斯隆基金会的财政支持。李胜武、乔治·梅拉斯、罗杰·迈尔森、亚历山德罗·帕万、哈里·佩、卢多维奇·雷诺、亚当·塞德尔、尤索·托伊卡和鲍勃·威尔逊;Austin、Bocconi、Collegio Carlo Alberto、Cowles、Harvard-MIT、Kobe、LSE、NYU、UPenn、Princeton、Queen Mary、Stony Brook、UCL、UCLA 和 UCSD 的研讨会参与者;和匿名裁判。Daniel Clark 和 Hideo Suehiro 仔细阅读了论文,并给了我们很好的评论。Wolitzky 感谢 NSF 和斯隆基金会的财政支持。Daniel Clark 和 Hideo Suehiro 仔细阅读了论文,并给了我们很好的评论。Wolitzky 感谢 NSF 和斯隆基金会的财政支持。Daniel Clark 和 Hideo Suehiro 仔细阅读了论文,并给了我们很好的评论。Wolitzky 感谢 NSF 和斯隆基金会的财政支持。
更新日期:2020-08-03
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