In 2010, the US Supreme Court loosened contribution limits to Political Action Committees (PACs), sparking fears that big donors could exert outsize influence on elections by funding PAC advertising. However, PACs are potentially handicapped when buying advertising time; data from 2012 reveal that PACs pay 32% above regulated campaign rates. I estimate a model of demand for advertising by PACs, exploiting the misalignment of state and media market borders to address price endogeneity. I find that prices reflect willingness‐to‐pay for viewer demographics rather than media bias. The estimates further suggest that network‐owned stations discriminate more successfully than do local affiliates.

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政治广告中的价格歧视：2012年总统大选的证据

2010年，美国最高法院放宽了对政治行动委员会（PACs）的捐款限制，引发了人们的担忧，即大捐助者可能会通过为PAC广告提供资金来对选举施加巨大影响。但是，PAC在购买广告时间时可能会遇到障碍。2012年的数据显示，PAC支付的费用比规定的竞选费用高32％。我估计了PAC的广告需求模型，它利用州和媒体市场边界的错位来解决价格内生性。我发现价格反映了愿意为观看者的受众群体付费的意愿，而不是媒体的偏见。估计还表明，网络拥有的电台比本地分支机构更能成功地进行区分。