This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy.

中文翻译：

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排他性交易的需求-收益理论

本文统一了迄今为止被认为是截然不同的各种分析排他交易的方法。这些方法的共同点是，企业偏离有效定价，将边际价格提高到边际成本之上。我们证明，在价格扭曲的情况下，只要优势企业相对于竞争对手具有竞争优势，排他性交易就可以直接获利和反竞争。优势企业直接受益，而不是在将来或在邻近市场获利，这要归功于购买者签订独家合同时需求的增长。我们讨论了该理论对反托拉斯政策的影响。