当前位置: X-MOL 学术Q. J. Econ. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
God Insures those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana*
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ( IF 11.1 ) Pub Date : 2020-07-06 , DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa015
Emmanuelle Auriol 1, 2 , Julie Lassébie 3 , Amma Panin 4 , Eva Raiber 4 , Paul Seabright 1, 3
Affiliation  

This paper presents experimental evidence exploring how insurance might be a motive for religious donations by members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana. We ran- domize enrollment into a commercially available funeral insurance policy and let church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own churches. At the same time, enrollment in insurance reduces giving towards other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religious based insurance. The implications of the model and the results of the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that community-based material insurance is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.

中文翻译:

上帝保证那些付钱的人?加纳的正规保险和宗教产品*

本文提供了实验证据,探讨了保险如何成为加纳五旬节教会成员进行宗教捐赠的动机。我们将入学券随机纳入市售的fun葬保险单中,让教会成员在一系列有大量赌注的独裁游戏中,在自己和一套宗教物品之间分配资金。参加保险的会员给自己教堂的钱大大减少了。同时,参加保险会减少对其他精神物品的捐助。我们建立了一个模型,探索基于宗教的保险的不同渠道。该模型的含义和独裁者游戏的结果表明,信奉者将教会视为保险的来源,而这种保险源于对干预主义上帝的信仰。
更新日期:2020-07-06
down
wechat
bug