The point of departure of this short paper is that, in order to preserve the effectiveness of monetary policy in a world increasingly flooded by private digital currencies, central banks (CBs) will eventually have to issue their own digital currencies. The paper presents two proposals for the implementation of such a currency: A moderate proposal in which only the banking sector continues to have access to deposits at the CB and a radical one in which the entire private sector is allowed to hold digital currency deposits at the CB. The paper contrasts the implications of those two polar paths to a CBDC for the funding of banks, the allocation of credit to the economy, for welfare and for political feasibility. One section of the paper shows that the radical implementation may pave the way toward a narrow banking system and dramatically reduce the need for deposit insurance in the long run. The paper evaluates the relative merits of issuing a currency on a blockchain using a permissionless distributed ledger technology in comparison to a centralized (permissioned) blockchain ledger operated by the CB and concludes that the latter dominates the former in more than one dimension.

中文翻译：

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关于中央银行数字货币的福利和政治经济方面的思考

这篇简短论文的出发点是，为了在日益被私人数字货币淹没的世界中保持货币政策的有效性，中央银行（CB）最终将不得不发行自己的数字货币。该文件提出了两种实施这种货币的建议：一种适度的建议，其中仅银行部门继续可以在央行购买存款，而另一种极端的建议是，允许整个私营部门在该机构持有数字货币存款。 CB。本文对比了这两个通往CBDC的两极途径对银行融资，对经济的信贷分配，对福利和政治可行性的影响。本文的一个部分表明，从根本上实施这种做法可能会为狭窄的银行体系铺平道路，并从长远来看大大减少了对存款保险的需求。这篇论文评估了与CB运营的集中式（允许的）区块链分类账相比，使用无许可的分布式分类账技术在区块链上发行货币的相对优势，并得出结论，后者在一个以上维度上主导着前者。