We analyze the effects of the adoption of real‐time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off‐peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non‐switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%.

中文翻译：

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电力市场中的实时定价和不完全竞争*

我们分析了发电公司具有市场支配力时采用实时定价（RTP）的影响。我们发现，RTP合同上的消费者增加会降低峰值价格并提高非高峰价格，增加消费者剩余（包括转换和非转换消费者）和福利，同时降低行业利润，这些影响在以下方面被放大：市场力量。我们通过针对新西兰电力市场校准我们的模型来说明这些结果，并发现考虑到发电公司的市场力量可使采用RTP的效率提高41％。