We examine how forward contracts affect economic outcomes under generalized market structures. In the model, forward contracts discipline the exercise of market power by making profit less sensitive to changes in output. This impact is greatest in markets with intermediate levels of concentration. Mergers reduce the use of forward contracts in equilibrium and, in markets that are sufficiently concentrated, this amplifies the adverse effects on consumer surplus. Additional analyses of merger profitability and collusion are provided. Throughout, we illustrate and extend the theoretical results using Monte Carlo simulations. We discuss the practical relevance for antitrust enforcement.

中文翻译：

---

远期合同，市场结构与并购的福利效应

我们研究了远期合同如何影响广义市场结构下的经济成果。在该模型中，远期合同通过使利润对产出变化的敏感性降低来约束市场支配力的行使。在中间水平集中的市场中，这种影响最大。合并减少了均衡中远期合约的使用，并且在充分集中的市场中，这放大了对消费者剩余的不利影响。提供了对合并获利能力和共谋的其他分析。在整个过程中，我们使用蒙特卡洛模拟说明并扩展了理论结果。我们讨论了反托拉斯执法的实际意义。