I examine the effect of competition on the production and use of innovations using evidence from a natural experiment of policy reform, the introduction of cartel legislation in the U.K. in the late 1950’s. I compare manufacturing industries which had been collusive and were therefore affected by the policy with those that had been competitive and were not affected. The intensification of competition following the abolition of cartels caused a short‐run decrease in innovations produced, but had no significant effect in the long run. In contrast, innovations used increased both in the short run and in the long run.

中文翻译：

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竞争，创新和创新的运用

我使用政策改革的自然实验，1950年代后期英国引入卡特尔立法的证据来检验竞争对创新生产和使用的影响。我将那些相互勾结，因此受到政策影响的制造业与那些竞争而不受到影响的制造业进行了比较。废除卡特尔后竞争加剧，短期内产生的创新减少，但从长远来看却没有显着影响。相反，从短期和长期来看，所使用的创新都在增加。