It is well known in the credence‐good literature that in an expert‐client relationship, under the Liability assumptions, clients have to reject the expert’s serious‐treatment recommendations with a positive probability to ensure that the expert honestly recommends treatments. Inefficiency arises because some socially efficient treatments are not provided. We show that the expert can enhance clients’ trust, or acceptance rate of the serious treatment, by providing intrinsically socially inefficient customer service upon recommending the serious treatment. Enhanced clients’ trust leads to higher efficiency and higher profit for the expert. However, trust cannot be enhanced by providing customer service with different timing.

中文翻译：

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使用客户服务来建立客户的信任*

在信誉良好的文献中众所周知，在专家与客户的关系中，根据责任假设，客户必须以肯定的概率拒绝专家的严重治疗建议，以确保专家诚实地建议治疗。由于未提供某些社会有效的治疗方法而导致效率低下。我们表明，专家可以通过在推荐严重治疗后提供本质上社会效率低下的客户服务来提高客户对严重治疗的信任或接受率。增强客户的信任度可以为专家带来更高的效率和更高的利润。但是，不能通过为客户服务提供不同的时间来增强信任。