This paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors actions, choose whether to rollover funding, or not. The uncoordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies the coordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analyzed.

中文翻译：

---

通过协调失败成为金融加速器

本文在动态一般均衡框架中研究了流动性危机对短期债务市场的影响。债权人（零售银行）收到关于借款人（批发银行）盈利能力的不完美信号，并根据这些信号和他们对其他债权人行为的看法，选择是否展期融资。债权人的不协调行动导致了次优的展期发生率，从而产生了非流动性溢价。杠杆放大了协调的低效率。信贷市场流动性不足的冲击导致产出急剧收缩。分析了政策反应。