IF it is a truism that hard cases make bad law, it can be equally true that easy cases are capable of creating, or perpetuating, questionable propositions of law. Academic engagement with the detailed reasoning of judges has a tendency to focus on only one aspect of how the common law develops. In an avowedly incrementalist system, the way in which the arguments are advanced and the facts upon which they are based significantly frame the outcome. If an ambitious or novel argument is run badly, or on facts which are not well-suited to it, the impact can go beyond the individual case: the court may express its conclusions in terms which preclude the same argument in future, better, cases. Browne v Parole Board of England and Wales [2018] EWCA Civ 2024 is such a case. The long-running academic debate about whether or not proportionality should function as a free-standing ground of judicial review at common law, outside the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 or EU law, is precisely the sort of context in which the trend of the case law can easily be tilted by a particular case. The argument for proportionality at common law has been reinvigorated to some extent over the last few years with a succession of Supreme Court judgments which have appeared to indicate support for moving away from the rationality standard: see especially, Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2015] A.C. 455; Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1591; and, to a lesser extent, R. (Youssef) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3, [2016] A.C. 1457. Kennedy and Pham were cases in which the discussion of the common law standard of review took place in a context of arguments seeking to apply proportionality under Convention rights and EU law respectively, whereas Youssef was a common law challenge to inclusion in a UN sanctions list which sought to adopt the proportionality standard outright. Practitioners have not been shy in seeking to expand the breadth of judicial review on the basis of dicta from these cases, but the courts have been reluctant to engage with a wider role for proportionality at common law in detail. The Supreme Court declined to decide upon the wholesale replacement of rationality review with a structured proportionality analysis in R. (Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69, [2016] A.C. 1355, both because the claim failed whatever standard applied and because a larger constitution of the Court was required for such a step. The door, accordingly, could have been left ajar for a case with the right facts. Mr. Browne was serving a prison sentence for a particularly violent burglary and assault. He was released on licence, whereupon he repeatedly C.L.J. 5 Case and Comment

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普通法上的比例性：另一种虚假的黎明

如果说困难的案例会制定不好的法律是不言而喻的，那么，简单的案例就有能力创造或使可疑的法律主张永久存在，这同样可以成立。学术界对法官进行详细推理的趋势倾向于只关注普通法如何发展的一个方面。在一个公开的渐进主义体系中，论据的提出方式和论据所依据的事实显着地构成了结果。如果雄心勃勃或新颖的论点表现不佳，或基于不适合该事实的事实，其影响可能会超出个别案件：法院可能会以排除未来，更好的情况下相同论点的措辞来表达其结论。 。布朗诉英格兰和威尔士的假释委员会[2018] EWCA Civ 2024案就是这样。在1998年《人权法》或欧盟法律的适用范围之外，关于比例是否应作为普通法司法复核的独立依据的长期学术辩论，恰恰是这种趋势的背景。案例法很容易因特定案例而倾斜。过去几年来，随着最高法院的一系列判决似乎在某种程度上重新激发了普通法上的相称性论点，这些判决似乎表明了对偏离合理性标准的支持：尤其是，见肯尼迪诉慈善委员会[2014] UKSC 20，[2015] AC 455；Pham诉内政部国务卿[2015] UKSC 19，[2015] 1 WLR 1591；R.（Youssef）诉外交和联邦事务大臣[2016] UKSC 3，[2016] AC 1457。肯尼迪（Kennedy）和潘（Pham）都是在分别寻求根据《公约》权利和欧盟法律适用相称性的论点的背景下讨论普通法审查标准的案件，而优素福则是将普通法纳入联合国制裁名单的挑战。力求完全采用比例标准。从业人员从这些案件的旨出发，并不愿意寻求扩大司法审查的广度，但法院一直不愿在普通法中详细地发挥相称性的作用。最高法院拒绝就R.（Keyu）诉外交和联邦事务大臣[2015] UKSC 69，[2016] AC 1355，既因为索赔不符合适用的标准，又因为采取此步骤需要更大的法院组成。因此，对于一个有正确事实的案子，本来可以敞开大门。布朗先生因入室盗窃和殴打特别猛烈而被判入狱。他被许可释放，随后他反复CLJ 5案和评论