This article is concerned with the question of whether malice is an appropriate touchstone of liability in tort law. It begins by identifying four torts in which malice may properly be regarded as an ingredient of liability (distinguishing various other torts, such as private nuisance and defamation, in which malice plays a merely secondary and contingent role). Having identified these four torts – namely malicious prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy – the article then seeks to identify a common juridical thread which links them together. So doing serves to rebut the allegation, often made in respect of all them, namely, that they are anomalous actions. It then concludes by considering the individual worth of these torts, bearing in mind the important difference between not being anomalous on the one hand, and being positively meritorious on the other. It concludes that a respectable defence of each of the four torts can be made even though malice is an atypical touchstone of liability.

中文翻译：

---

恶意作为侵权责任的组成部分

本文关注的问题是恶意是否是侵权法中适当的责任试金石。它首先确定了四种侵权行为，其中恶意可以适当地被视为责任的组成部分（区分各种其他侵权行为，例如私人滋扰和诽谤，其中恶意只是次要和偶然的作用）。在确定了这四种侵权行为——即恶意起诉、滥用程序、公职人员渎职和合法手段共谋——之后，本文试图确定将它们联系在一起的共同司法线索。这样做有助于反驳通常针对所有这些行为的指控，即它们是异常行为。然后通过考虑这些侵权行为的个人价值得出结论，牢记一方面不异常，另一方面积极有功之间的重要区别。它的结论是，即使恶意是非典型的责任试金石，也可以对四种侵权行为中的每一种进行体面的辩护。