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THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Cambridge Law Journal ( IF 1.5 ) Pub Date : 2019-04-23 , DOI: 10.1017/s000819731900028x
Kirsty Hughes

This article argues that the public figure doctrine is doctrinally problematic and conceptually and normatively flawed. Doctrinal uncertainty surrounds who is affected and how rights are affected. Conceptually it raises challenges for universality, the non-hierarchical relationship between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR, the process of resolving rights conflicts, and the relationship between domestic law and the Convention. All of which necessitate a strong normative justification for the distinction. Yet there is no compelling rationale. The values underpinning the right to privacy of public figures are no different from those of other persons and there are other better mechanisms of accounting for freedom of expression. We should therefore reject the idea that public figures have fewer or weaker privacy rights or that the process of dealing with their rights is different and instead focus squarely upon the relative importance of the rights, and the degree of intrusion into those rights.

中文翻译:

公众人物学说和隐私权

本文认为,公众人物学说在教义上存在问题,在概念上和规范上存在缺陷。教义上的不确定性围绕着谁受到影响以及权利如何受到影响。从概念上讲,它对普遍性、《欧洲人权公约》第 8 条和第 10 条之间的非等级关系、解决权利冲突的过程以及国内法与公约之间的关系提出了挑战。所有这些都需要强有力的规范性理由来区分。然而,没有令人信服的理由。支撑公众人物隐私权的价值观与其他人的价值观没有什么不同,还有其他更好的机制来解释言论自由。
更新日期:2019-04-23
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