This study investigates the unique implementation of a social choice function in iterative dominance in the ex-post term. We assume partial ex-post verifiability; that is, after determining an allocation, the central planner can observe partial information about the state as verifiable. We demonstrate a condition of the state space, termed “full detection,” and show that with full detection, any social choice function is uniquely implementable even if the information that can be verified ex-post is very limited. To prove this, we construct a dynamic mechanism according to which each player announces his (or her) private signal, before the other players observe this signal, at an earlier stage, and each player also announces the state at a later stage. In this construction, we can impose several severe restrictions such as boundedness, permission of only tiny transfers off the equilibrium path, and no permission of transfers on the equilibrium path. This study does not assume either expected utility or quasi-linearity.

这项研究调查了事后任期在迭代支配地位中社会选择功能的独特实现。我们假设部分事后核查；也就是说，在确定分配之后，中央计划者可以观察到关于该状态的部分信息是可验​​证的。我们演示了状态空间的状态，称为“完全检测”，并显示了通过完全检测，即使可以事后验证的信息非常有限，任何社会选择功能都是可以唯一实现的。为了证明这一点，我们构建了一种动态机制，根据该机制，每个玩家在较早的阶段观察其他信号之前，每个玩家都宣布自己的（或她）私人信号，并且每个玩家也在较后阶段宣布状态。在这种结构中，我们可以施加一些严格的限制，例如有界，仅允许微小的转移离开平衡路径，而不允许转移到平衡路径上。这项研究没有假设预期效用或准线性。