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Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
Social Choice and Welfare ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-06 , DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01290-y
René van den Brink , Dinko Dimitrov , Agnieszka Rusinowska

We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way that a winning coalition in a partition is always one for which the sum of the weights of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is called decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that in general, plurality games need not be weighted, even not when they are decisive. After that, we prove that (i) decisive plurality games with at most four players, (ii) majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and (iii) decisive plurality games that exhibit some kind of symmetry, are weighted. Complete characterizations of the winning coalitions in the corresponding partitions are provided as well.



中文翻译:

在多个投票民主国家中赢得联盟

我们认为多个投票游戏是具有分区功能形式的简单游戏,因此在每个分区中至少有一个获胜联盟。如果可以按以下方式为玩家分配权重,即分区中的获胜联盟始终为该游戏的成员权重之和在分区中的所有联盟中最大,则称此类游戏为加权。如果在每个分区中恰好有一个获胜联盟,则多个游戏被称为决定性游戏。我们证明,一般来说,即使对多个游戏都没有决定性的影响,也不必对其进行加权。此后,我们证明(i)具有最多四个玩家的决定性多元游戏,(ii)具有任意数量的玩家的多数游戏,以及(iii)表现出某种对称性的具有决定性的多元游戏。

更新日期:2020-10-06
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