Abstract

The Great Financial Crisis ushered unorthodox financial policies that would have been unfathomable before 2008. Perhaps unexpectedly, some of the boldest measures on this unorthodox spectrum were adopted in semi-peripheral and therefore theoretically vulnerable countries such as some of the European Union’s new member states from East-Central Europe. Why did policy makers in some of these countries (Hungary, Romania) embark on rolling back financialization and resort to financial repression in ways that targeted foreign banks in contexts in which this seemed a very risky strategy? Why did such bold moves generally re-established state-finance relations in some countries (Hungary) while comparably milder ones left them generally unaltered in others (Romania)? Finally, why have some countries refrained altogether from such forms of financial unorthodoxy (Latvia)? The paper explains the varieties of policy responses in these countries, with three factors: the role of finance in the national growth model, the capacity of the state to protect itself against adverse bond market reactions and international constraints and opportunities.

摘要

大金融危机带来了在 2008 年之前深不可测的非正统金融政策。 也许出乎意料的是，一些针对这一非正统范围的最大胆措施被半外围国家采用，因此理论上脆弱的国家，例如欧盟的一些新成员国东中欧。为什么其中一些国家（匈牙利、罗马尼亚）的政策制定者开始遏制金融化并采取针对外国银行的金融抑制手段，而在这种情况下，这似乎是一个非常冒险的战略？为什么如此大胆的举措在一些国家（匈牙利）普遍重建了国家财政关系，而相对温和的举措在其他国家（罗马尼亚）则基本保持不变？最后，为什么有些国家完全避免这种形式的金融非正统（拉脱维亚）？本文解释了这些国家的各种政策反应，包括三个因素：金融在国家增长模式中的作用、国家保护自己免受债券市场不利反应的能力以及国际约束和机遇。