Abstract

Scholars of global governance tend to agree that international organizations (IOs) enjoy expert authority because they provide applicable specialist knowledge for policymaking. This view implies that IOs’ expert status rests more on the contents than the presentation of their knowledge. Integrating the sociological concept of ‘boundary work’ into a Goffmanian symbolic-dramaturgical perspective, this article articulates a competing interpretation that recovers the relational and performative aspects of expert authority. I argue that, in settings where spheres of authority overlap, boundary work by IOs serves two loosely coupled functions: demarcation and cooperation. While IOs demarcate their jurisdictions on the ‘frontstage’ to craft perceptions of exclusive expertise, they closely cooperate on the ‘backstage’ to mitigate internal resource constraints. I illustrate this argument by examining the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank (or Bank) around the joint Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Based on elite interviews and relevant documents, the analysis shows that the IMF’s frontstage boundary work entailed promoting FSAP reforms and launching a new surveillance initiative without the World Bank. Yet while demarcation can augment an IO’s expertise, it risks poisoning inter-organizational relationships.

摘要

全球治理学者倾向于同意国际组织 (IO) 享有专家权威，因为它们为政策制定提供适用的专业知识。这种观点意味着 IO 的专家地位更多地取决于内容，而不是他们知识的呈现。本文将“边界工作”的社会学概念整合到戈夫曼的象征戏剧观点中，阐明了一种相互竞争的解释，恢复了专家权威的关系和表演方面。我认为，在权力范围重叠的环境中，IO 的边界工作服务于两个松散耦合的功能：划界和合作。虽然 IO 在“前台”界定他们的管辖范围，以塑造对独家专业知识的看法，他们在“后台”密切合作，以缓解内部资源限制。我通过围绕联合金融部门评估计划 (FSAP) 研究国际货币基金组织（IMF 或基金）与世界银行（或银行）之间的关系来说明这一论点。根据精英访谈和相关文件，分析表明，IMF 的前台边界工作需要推动 FSAP 改革，并在没有世界银行的情况下启动新的监督举措。然而，虽然划界可以增强 IO 的专业知识，但它可能会破坏组织间的关系。分析表明，IMF 的前台边界工作需要推动 FSAP 改革并在没有世界银行的情况下启动一项新的监督计划。然而，虽然划界可以增强 IO 的专业知识，但它可能会破坏组织间的关系。分析表明，IMF 的前台边界工作需要推动 FSAP 改革并在没有世界银行的情况下启动一项新的监督计划。然而，虽然划界可以增强 IO 的专业知识，但它可能会破坏组织间的关系。