Abstract

What explains the nature of a dominant state’s systemic crisis response? In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the U.S. acted as the hegemon for the world economy, showing ‘benign’ leadership by serving as consumer, investor, and lender of last resort. During the euro crisis two years later, Germany played a rather different role, practicing a more ‘coercive’ form of rules-based leadership within Europe’s regional context. In this paper, I explain how ideas and crisis narratives, informed by national economic traditions, shaped how the leading states behaved. By rescuing Charles Kindleberger’s original version of hegemonic stability theory from both its realist and liberal institutionalist interpreters, the paper clarifies why elites in the U.S. followed a hardheaded path of soft Keynesian ideas resulting in global public goods provision while their counterparts in Germany, be it more constrained, opted for a more principled road of rule enforcing ordo-liberal ideas avoiding public goods provision. The crucial role of ideas – in addition to structural and institutional factors – in defining the national interest during periods of crisis helps us better understand “why hegemonic leadership is what states make of it.” This led American and German elites to interpret Kindleberger in very different ways.

摘要

什么解释了主导国家系统性危机应对的本质？2008 年全球金融危机之后，美国扮演了世界经济霸主的角色，通过充当消费者、投资者和最后贷款人的角色显示出“良性”领导力。在两年后的欧元危机中，德国扮演了完全不同的角色，在欧洲地区范围内实行了一种更加“强制”的基于规则的领导形式。在本文中，我解释了受国家经济传统影响的思想和危机叙事如何塑造了主要国家的行为方式。通过从现实主义和自由制度主义解释者手中拯救查尔斯·金德尔伯格的霸权稳定理论的原始版本，该论文阐明了为什么美国的精英 遵循了软凯恩斯主义思想的顽固道路，导致全球公共产品的提供，而德国的同行，尽管受到更多限制，却选择了一条更有原则的道路，执行规则自由主义思想，避免提供公共产品。除了结构性和制度性因素之外，思想在危机期间定义国家利益方面的关键作用有助于我们更好地理解“为什么霸权领导权是国家所造就的”。这导致美国和德国精英以截然不同的方式解读金德尔伯格。除了结构性和制度性因素之外，思想在危机期间定义国家利益方面的关键作用有助于我们更好地理解“为什么霸权领导权是国家所造就的”。这导致美国和德国精英以截然不同的方式解读金德尔伯格。除了结构性和制度性因素之外，思想在危机期间定义国家利益方面的关键作用有助于我们更好地理解“为什么霸权领导权是国家所造就的”。这导致美国和德国精英以截然不同的方式解读金德尔伯格。