Abstract

Voluntary supply chain regulation has proliferated in recent decades in response to concerns about the social and environmental impacts of global production and trade. Yet the capacity of supply chain regulation to influence production practices on the ground has been persistently questioned. Through empirical analysis of transnational regulatory interventions in the Indonesian tin sector—centered on a multi-stakeholder Tin Working Group established by prominent global electronics brands—this paper explores the challenges and limits of voluntary supply chain governance as it interacts with an entrenched ‘extractive settlement’ in Indonesia’s major tin producing islands of Bangka and Belitung. Although the Tin Working Group has introduced localized initiatives to tackle issues such as worker safety and improved land rehabilitation, it has also contributed in diffuse and largely unintended ways to consolidating the power of political and economic elites who benefit from centralized control over resource extraction. In this sense, supply chain governance has generated ‘hidden costs’ through unintended effects on power struggles between competing social groups at national and sub-national levels—generating marginal benefits for ameliorating specific regulatory ‘problems’, while consolidating and reproducing barriers to deeper transitions towards inclusive or sustainable regimes of extractive governance.

摘要

近几十年来，自愿供应链监管激增，以应对对全球生产和贸易的社会和环境影响的担忧。然而，供应链监管影响当地生产实践的能力一直受到质疑。通过对印尼锡业跨国监管干预的实证分析（以全球知名电子品牌建立的多利益相关方锡工作组为中心），本文探讨了自愿供应链治理与根深蒂固的“采掘式解决方案”相互作用时的挑战和局限性'在印度尼西亚的主要产锡岛屿邦加和勿里洞。尽管锡工作组已推出本地化举措来解决工人安全和改善土地复垦等问题，它还以分散且在很大程度上出乎意料的方式促成了巩固政治和经济精英的权力，这些精英从对资源开采的集中控制中受益。从这个意义上说，供应链治理通过对国家和地方层面的竞争社会群体之间的权力斗争产生意想不到的影响而产生了“隐藏成本”——为改善特定监管“问题”产生边际收益，同时巩固和复制障碍以实现更深层次的转型建立包容性或可持续的采掘性治理制度。