A multiproduct incumbent firm faces the threat of entry from another multiproduct (generalist) firm or from single-product (specialist) firms. Assuming that the incumbent offers higher quality products than its rivals, we inquire whether the possibility of bundling by the incumbent is more effective in deterring entry in one setting or the other, and explore how the quality difference affects the comparison. For instance, for relatively high-quality differences the generalist is more vulnerable to bundling than are the specialists; but bundling is a credible action for the incumbent more often against specialists than against the generalist.

中文翻译：

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捆绑与进入威慑

一家拥有多产品的老牌公司面临着另一家多产品（一般主义者）公司或单一产品（专业）公司进入的威胁。假设在位者提供的产品质量比其竞争对手高，我们询问在位者捆绑的可能性是否可以更有效地阻止进入一种或另一种环境，并探讨质量差异如何影响比较。例如，对于较高质量的差异，通才比专家更容易捆绑。但是，对于在职者来说，捆绑是对专家的可靠行动，而不是对通才的捆绑。