Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border or interstate externalities. The model predicts that centralised supervision endogenously increases market integration and cross-border externalities, further strengthening the need for centralised supervision. This complementarity implies that, for some parameterizations of the model, the economy can be trapped in a local supervision equilibrium with low supervision and integration. In such a case, the forward-looking introduction of a centralized supervisory architecture achieves a superior equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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银行联盟中的最佳监管架构和财务集成

在美国和欧元区，银行监管都是地方和中央/联邦监管机构的共同责任。我研究了这样的系统如何最佳地平衡地方监管人员的较低检查成本与中央机构内部化跨境或州际外部性的能力。该模型预测，集中监管会内生地增加市场整合和跨境外部性，从而进一步加强对集中监管的需求。这种互补性意味着，对于模型的某些参数化而言，经济可能陷入低监管和低集成的局部监管均衡中。在这种情况下，集中管理架构的前瞻性介绍可实现出色的平衡。