Hedge fund activism is associated with improvements in the governance and performance of targeted firms. In this article, we show that these positive effects of activism reach beyond the targets, as nontargeted peers make similar improvements under the threat of activism. Peers with higher threat perception, as measured by director connections to past targets, are more likely to increase leverage and payout, decrease capital expenditures and cash, and improve return on assets and asset turnover. As a result, their valuations improve, and their probability of being targeted declines. Our results are not explained by time-varying industry conditions or competition effects whereby improved targets force their product market rivals to become more competitive.

中文翻译：

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治理：对冲基金行动主义的溢出效应*

对冲基金行动主义与目标公司治理和绩效的改善相关。在本文中，我们证明了行动主义的积极影响超出了目标，因为非目标同伴在行动主义的威胁下做出了类似的改进。通过董事与过去目标的联系来衡量，具有较高威胁感知的同行更有可能提高杠杆率和支出，减少资本支出和现金，并提高资产回报率和资产周转率。结果，他们的估值提高了，成为目标的可能性下降了。时变的行业条件或竞争效应无法解释我们的结果，而改善的目标迫使竞争者的产品市场竞争对手变得更具竞争力。