We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and face aggregate liquidity shocks. Banks with liquidity shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former exists when credit market competition is intense. The latter emerges when banks exercise market power. Thus, competition is beneficial to financial stability. The structure of liquidity shocks affects the severity and the occurrence of crises, as well as the amount of credit available in the economy.

中文翻译：

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信贷市场竞争和流动性危机*

我们建立了一个模型，在该模型中，银行对储备和贷款进行投资，并面临总体流动性冲击。流动性短缺的银行在银行间市场上出售贷款。出现两个平衡。在没有违约平衡的情况下，所有银行都拥有足够的准备金并保持偿付能力。在混合均衡中，一些银行违约概率为正。前者存在于信贷市场竞争激烈的时候。后者在银行行使市场支配力时出现。因此，竞争有利于金融稳定。流动性冲击的结构会影响危机的严重性和发生率，以及经济中可用的信贷量。