Abstract

We study the inner workings of internal capital markets during the 2008–09 recession using a unique dataset of loans between business group firms in an emerging market. Intragroup loans increase quickly during the recession. Firms that are more central in the ownership network simultaneously increase lending and borrowing. Acting like simple intermediaries, central firms do not increase net lending. Our results imply that formal control rights are essential for intermediation in internal capital markets, particularly during distress. In line with previous results on winner-picking, receivers of intragroup loans are high-Q, financially constrained firms, which also perform significantly better than providers during the recession.

中文翻译：

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内部资本市场如何运作？经济大萧条的证据*

摘要

我们使用新兴市场中企业集团公司之间独特的贷款数据集，研究了2008-09年经济衰退期间内部资本市场的内部运作情况。在经济衰退期间，集团内部贷款迅速增加。在所有权网络中处于中心地位的公司会同时增加借贷。中央公司像简单的中介一样，不增加净贷款。我们的结果表明，正式的控制权对于内部资本市场的中介至关重要，尤其是在困境时期。与先前关于获胜者挑选的结果一致，集团内部贷款的接受者是高Q额，受财务约束的公司，在经济衰退期间，它们的表现也明显好于提供者。