We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information in which contestants have non-linear effort functions. The designer offers the option of insurance for which a contestant pays a premium to the contest designer. If a contestant does not win he is reimbursed the cost of his effort. We demonstrate that contests with insurance may be profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize his expected revenue as based on the contestants’ expected total effort, the premium of the insured contestants, and their reimbursement.

中文翻译：

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保险竞赛

我们研究不完全信息下的全薪拍卖，其中参赛者具有非线性努力功能。设计师提供保险选项，参赛者应向比赛设计师支付保险费。如果参赛者未获胜，他将获得努力费用的补偿。我们证明，对于希望根据参赛者的预期总工作量，被保参赛者的保费和补偿金来最大化其预期收入的设计师，保险竞赛可能会有利可图。