This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks, for games with link-responsive payoff functions.

中文翻译：

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网络形成博弈的均衡细化

本文研究了由于迈尔森造成的网络形成的正规形式博弈（博弈论：冲突分析，哈佛大学出版社，剑桥，1991年）。所有玩家同时宣布他们希望形成的链接。仅当在相互同意的情况下才创建链接。空网络始终是该游戏的纳什均衡。我们定义了纳什均衡的完善，我们称其为试验完美。我们表明，对于具有链接响应性收益函数的游戏，可以由纯策略试验完美均衡支持的网络集合与成对纳什均衡网络集合一致。