We study a federal government’s optimal redistributive policy across regions in the context of a model in which regions issue debt, invest in intergenerational public goods (IPGs), and have private information regarding the durability of their IPG investment. First, in both the complete-information and the asymmetric-information optimum, the region with a higher degree of intergenerational spillovers (H-region) should borrow more than the region with a lower degree (L-region). Second, to induce truth-telling under asymmetric information, the region not distorted on intertemporal allocation should be the contributor of redistribution. Third, the asymmetric-information optimum is implementable through decentralized regional debt decisions by imposing differentiated budget institutions: if H-region is distorted on intertemporal allocation, then it faces a debt floor; if L-region is distorted, then it faces a debt ceiling.

中文翻译：

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具有代际外部性的私人信息的区域间重新分配和预算机构

我们在一个模型中研究了联邦政府跨地区的最佳再分配政策，在该模型中，地区发行债务，投资代际公共物品（IPG），并获得有关其IPG投资持久性的私人信息。首先，在完整信息和非对称信息的最优情况下，代际溢出程度较高的区域（H区域）应比程度较低的区域（L区域）更多地借用。其次，为了在不对称信息下诱导事实叙述，不应将跨时间分配失真的区域作为重新分配的贡献者。第三，信息不对称最优可以通过分散的区域债务决策，通过实施有差别的预算制度来实现：如果H区域在跨期分配中发生扭曲，然后它面临债务底线；如果L区域失真，那么它将面临债务上限。