This study examines whether threat of stricter regulation influences the pricing behavior of firms. Using data on unregulated Swedish local district heating monopolists, we measure the threat level by the number of customer complaints about prices received by a national board. Exploiting a natural experiment, we find that firms reduce prices when customer complaints increase.

中文翻译：

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测试监管威胁假设：来自瑞典的证据

本研究探讨了更严格的监管威胁是否会影响企业的定价行为。我们使用不受管制的瑞典当地供热垄断者的数据，通过国家委员会收到的客户对价格投诉的数量来衡量威胁程度。利用自然实验，我们发现当客户投诉增加时，企业会降低价格。