A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.

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与下游竞争的合作合同

搭售合同作为排他性工具的角色经常受到审查。在一级市场上处于垄断地位的公司可以利用此类合同排除二级市场上更有效率的竞争对手。当公司通过竞争性零售商进行销售时，杠杆公司可能会向零售商提供捆绑合同，诱使他们完全从零售商那里购买初级产品和次级产品，从而将竞争对手排除在外。我们研究了在以下情况下（i）上游公司对价格作出承诺的能力和（ii）零售商之间的下游竞争的条件，这种捆绑合同对于老牌公司是否有利可图。我们证明了，当零售商在价格上竞争时，无论进入者是否能够承诺自己的价格，如果排他性企业能够（无法）承诺价格，那么排他性搭配策略就是有利可图的（非盈利性的）。但是，当零售商进行数量竞争时，进入者的承诺能力确实很重要。具体来说，当上游两家公司都能够承诺其价格时，排他性的结盟策略（i）可能对任职者无利可图，这取决于进入者的成本优势程度；（ii）仅靠价格就能获利；（iii）当两家上游公司均无法承诺其价格时，该公司无利可图。我们的结果扩展到产品互补或替代的情况，以及零售商本质上可能不对称的情况。参赛者的承诺能力确实很重要。具体来说，当上游两家公司都能够承诺其价格时，排他性的结盟策略（i）可能对任职者无利可图，这取决于进入者的成本优势程度；（ii）仅靠价格就能获利；（iii）当两家上游公司均无法承诺其价格时，该公司无利可图。我们的结果扩展到产品互补或替代的情况，以及零售商本质上可能不对称的情况。参赛者的承诺能力确实很重要。具体来说，当上游两家公司都能够承诺其价格时，排他性的结盟策略（i）可能对任职者无利可图，这取决于进入者的成本优势程度；（ii）仅靠价格就能获利；（iii）当两家上游公司均无法承诺其价格时，该公司无利可图。我们的结果扩展到产品互补或替代的情况，以及零售商本质上可能不对称的情况。（iii）当两家上游公司均无法承诺其价格时，该公司无利可图。我们的结果扩展到产品互补或替代的情况，以及零售商本质上可能不对称的情况。（iii）当两家上游公司均无法承诺其价格时，该公司无利可图。我们的结果扩展到产品互补或替代的情况，以及零售商本质上可能不对称的情况。