In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information‐sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When any two agents in the network are connected either directly or indirectly in a large network, empirical modeling using an equilibrium approach can be cumbersome, since the testable implications from an equilibrium generally involve all the players of the game, whereas a researcher's data set may contain only a fraction of these players in practice. This paper develops a tractable empirical model of linear interactions where each agent, after observing part of his neighbors' types, not knowing the full information network, uses best responses that are linear in his and other players' types that he observes, based on simple beliefs about the other players' strategies. We provide conditions on information networks and beliefs such that the best responses take an explicit form with multiple intuitive features. Furthermore, the best responses reveal how local payoff interdependence among agents is translated into local stochastic dependence of their actions, allowing the econometrician to perform asymptotic inference without having to observe all the players in the game or having to know the precise sampling process.

中文翻译：

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估计观察邻居的许多特工之间的本地互动

在各种经济环境中，人们观察与他们进行战略性互动的其他人。我们可以将信息共享关系建模为信息网络，将战略交互建模为网络上的游戏。当网络中的任何两个主体直接或间接连接到大型网络中时，使用均衡方法的经验建模可能会很麻烦，因为来自均衡的可测试含义通常涉及游戏的所有参与者，而研究人员的数据集可能在实践中只包含这些参与者的一小部分。本文建立了一个线性互动的易处理的经验模型，其中每个特工在观察部分邻居的类型而又不了解整个信息网络后，会使用其和其他参与者的线性最佳响应。他观察到的类型，基于对其他玩家策略的简单信念。我们提供有关信息网络和信念的条件，以便最佳响应采取具有多种直观功能的明确形式。此外，最佳响应揭示了代理商之间的本地收益相互依赖关系如何转化为他们的行为的本地随机依赖关系，从而使计量经济学家无需观察游戏中的所有玩家或无需知道精确的采样过程即可执行渐近推断。