ABSTRACT

We investigate whether lending by the dominant Russian state bank, Sberbank, contributed to Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power during the presidential elections of March2000. Our hypothesis is that Sberbank corporate loans were used as incentives for managers at private firms to mobilize employees to vote for Putin. In line with our proposed voter mobilization mechanism, we find that the growth of regional corporate Sberbank loans in the months before the presidential election is related to the regional increase in votes for Putin and to the regional increase in voter turnout between the Duma election of December1999 and the presidential election of March2000. The effect is pronounced in regions where the governor is affiliated with the regime and in regions with extensive private employment, and less apparent in regions bequeathed with single-company towns, where voter intimidation suffices to get the required result. The results are highly robust.

摘要

我们调查了在2000年3月的总统大选期间，俄罗斯主要国有银行（Sberbank）的放贷是否对弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）的上台做出了贡献。我们的假设是，Sberbank公司的贷款被用作激励私人公司经理人动员员工投票支持普京的动机。根据我们提议的选民动员机制，我们发现在总统选举前的几个月中，Sberbank地区公司贷款的增长与普京地区选票的增加以及1999年12月杜马大选之间选民投票率的地区增加有关。以及2000年3月的总统选举。在州长与该政权有联系的地区以及拥有大量私人就业机会的地区，这种影响尤为明显，在单一公司镇遗留的地区，这种情况就不那么明显了，那里的选民恐吓足以获得所需的结果。结果非常可靠。