ABSTRACT

Since about 2009, increasing budgetary constraints forced the Russian state to become notably less tolerant of lower-level corruption and predatory behavior by state agencies. In this paper, we argue that after a first stage of decentralized corruption and state capture during the 1990s, and a second period of decentralized corruption and business capture during the 2000s, Russia has entered a third stage of more centralized corruption since 2009. We build our argument on a detailed discussion of property rights relations in Russia, and support it with indicative quantitative data, suggesting that raiding attacks on businesses and corrupt behavior by state agencies have become less frequent and more centralized between 2009 and 2016. The sustainability of this move towards a more centralized mode of corruption remains questionable, however, mainly due to the lack of a long-term vision for the development of the country.

摘要

自2009年左右以来，越来越多的预算限制迫使俄罗斯政府对国家机构对低层腐败和掠夺行为的容忍度明显降低。在本文中，我们认为，在1990年代第一阶段的权力下放腐败和国家占领之后，以及2000年代的第二阶段的权力下放腐败和商业占领之后，俄罗斯自2009年起进入了第三阶段的更集中的腐败。我们对俄罗斯的产权关系进行详细讨论的论点，并提供了指示性的定量数据来支持这一论点，这表明，在2009年至2016年之间，对企业的袭击和国家机构的腐败行为遭到袭击的频率降低了，而且变得更加集中。此举的可持续性然而，朝着更集中的腐败模式迈进仍然值得怀疑，