ABSTRACT

The article discusses the post-Soviet de facto state of Abkhazia, and its relationship to its main patron, Russia. All patron–client nexuses are marked by a high degree of asymmetrical power – especially with de facto states, which depend upon the patron for their very survival. Thus, it is surprising to see how de facto client states repeatedly show that they are both willing and able to defy the wishes of their patrons and pursue their own agendas instead. Moreover, the patron may be willing to tolerate such rebelliousness. What can explain such “disobedient” behavior? I examine three contentious aspects of Russian–Abkhazian relations: the process leading up to the signing of an extended bilateral agreement in 2014; the tussles over how to fight crime in Abkhazia; and acrimony over Abkhazia’s reluctance to allow Russians to buy property in their country, despite massive pressure from Russian authorities.

摘要

本文讨论了阿布哈兹的后苏联事实上的国家，及其与主要赞助国俄罗斯的关系。所有顾客-顾客关系都以高度不对称的力量为特征-尤其是事实上的状态，这取决于顾客的生存。因此，令人惊讶的是，事实上客户国如何反复表明他们既愿意又有能力违抗顾客的意愿，而是追求自己的议程。而且，顾客可能愿意容忍这种叛逆。有什么可以解释这种“不听话”的行为？我研究了俄罗斯与阿布哈兹关系的三个有争议的方面：导致2014年签署扩大的双边协议的过程；关于如何在阿布哈兹打击犯罪的争论；