ABSTRACT

This article uses a unique dataset from the September 2019 municipal elections in St. Petersburg in order to examine empirically the efficacy of strategic voting under authoritarianism, as manifest in the effects of the “smart vote campaign” of Alexei Navalny in Russia. The analysis allows for the conclusion that the campaign, while technically similar to the vote advice applications that are now widespread in many democracies, was efficient enough to make a significant difference in the overtly authoritarian context. We demonstrate empirically that Navalny’s call for strategic voting did indeed affect the behavior of the electorate, particularly by improving strategic coordination among opposition-minded voters; that the electoral results of the candidates backed by the “smart vote” campaign tended to be better than the electoral results of other non–United Russia candidates; and that as a result of the “smart vote” campaign, the dominant party’s electoral results deteriorated quite visibly.

摘要

本文使用来自圣彼得堡的2019年9月市政选举的独特数据集，以从经验上检验威权主义下战略投票的效力，这在俄罗斯的阿列克谢·纳瓦尼（Alexei Navalny）的“智能投票运动”的影响中得到了体现。该分析得出的结论是，该运动虽然在技术上类似于现在在许多民主国家中广泛使用的投票咨询应用程序，但其效率足以在公开的威权主义环境中产生重大影响。我们凭经验证明，纳瓦尔尼号召进行战略投票确实确实影响了选民的行为，特别是通过改善反对派选民之间的战略协调。在“智能投票”运动的支持下，候选人的选举结果往往要好于其他非统一俄罗斯候选人的选举结果；而且由于“智能投票”运动，优势党的选举结果明显恶化。