This study aims to empirically identify how a bank’s board structure (size, independence, and members’ affiliations) and quality (experience, background, and skills) affect its risk incentives. Specifically, it investigates whether banks’ solvency and corporate governance nexus changed after the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We employ a cross-country sample of 239 commercial and publicly traded banks covering 1997–2016 and a panel regression for 40 countries. We acknowledge a negative relationship between board size and bank stability and demonstrate that an independent board may have constrained rather than encouraged risk in banks. The global financial crisis has not changed much in the corporate governance and stability of banks nexus. These findings are robust even while controlling for a range of alternative sensitivity estimations for bank stability. This result indicates that in the aftermath of the market meltdown, we still need to strengthen corporate governance practices which may mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis on the banking sector.

中文翻译：

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公司董事会属性对银行稳定性的影响

本研究旨在通过经验确定银行的董事会结构（规模，独立性和成员的隶属关系）和质量（经验，背景和技能）如何影响其风险激励措施。具体来说，它调查了2007-2009年金融危机之后银行的偿付能力和公司治理关系是否发生了变化。我们采用了涵盖1997-2016年的239家商业和公开交易银行的跨国样本，并对40个国家/地区进行了面板回归。我们承认董事会规模与银行稳定性之间存在负相关关系，并表明独立董事会可能在银行中约束而不是鼓励风险。全球金融危机在公司治理和银行关系稳定性方面没有太大变化。这些发现即使在控制一系列关于堤岸稳定性的敏感性估算时也很可靠。该结果表明，在市场崩溃之后，我们仍然需要加强公司治理实践，以减轻危机对银行业的不利影响。