There is a long-standing debate about how best to explain rights – one dominated by two rivals, the Interest and Will theories. This article argues that, not only is each theory irredeemably flawed, the entire debate ought to be abandoned. Section two explains the debate and its constituent theories as a dispute over the criteria for the concept of a right, or for some subset of rights. Section three argues that each theory contains fatal idiosyncratic defects – ones that mostly differ from the canonical criticisms found throughout the literature. Section four then argues that the theories also suffer from graver common defects that have hitherto gone undetected. First, their criteria are unmotivated, unjustified, and of questionable accuracy. Secondly, rights theorists’ own commitments to different kinds of accounts of rights (i.e., models) and theories of law (e.g., legal positivism) show why any theory of this sort is unnecessary for understanding rights.

中文翻译：

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反对权利理论的案例

关于如何最好地解释权利的争论由来已久——一场由利益理论和意志理论这两个竞争对手主导。本文认为，不仅每个理论都有无可挽回的缺陷，整个辩论都应该放弃。第二部分将辩论及其构成理论解释为对权利概念或某些权利子集的标准的争论。第三部分认为每个理论都包含致命的特质缺陷——这些缺陷与整个文献中发现的规范批评大不相同。然后，第四部分认为这些理论还存在迄今为止未被发现的更严重的常见缺陷。首先，他们的标准是没有动机的、不合理的，而且准确性有问题。其次，权利理论家自己对不同类型的权利解释的承诺（即，