This article argues that anti-discrimination rights are individual rights to be free from wrongful treatment and do not directly advance group-based interests or prohibit group-based harm. In light of this, a number of recurring accounts of the wrong of discrimination, particularly the wrong of indirect discrimination, are unsustainable. Claims that indirect discrimination is concerned with harm that is done to social groups or that laws prohibiting indirect discrimination seek to reduce or eliminate advantage gaps between social groups must be rejected as inaccurate. While principles of non-discrimination and principles of affirmative action often operate harmoniously to foster respect for the moral equality of persons, they each have a general affinity with distinct ethical traditions: deontology and teleology respectively. As such, we should conclude that indirect discrimination provisions are examples of formal and not substantive equality. Where rights to non-discrimination conflict with telic equality goals, UK law protects the rights of the individual.

中文翻译：

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作为个人错误的歧视

本文认为，反歧视权是个人不受不当待遇的权利，不直接推进群体利益或禁止群体伤害。有鉴于此，一些反复出现的歧视错误，特别是间接歧视错误的说法是站不住脚的。间接歧视与对社会群体造成的伤害有关，或者禁止间接歧视的法律试图减少或消除社会群体之间的优势差距的说法必须被驳回，因为这是不准确的。虽然非歧视原则和平权行动原则经常协调运作以促进对人的道德平等的尊重，但它们各自与不同的伦理传统有着普遍的联系：分别是义务论和目的论。因此，我们应该得出结论，间接歧视条款是形式平等而非实质性平等的例子。如果不受歧视的权利与 Telic 平等目标发生冲突，英国法律会保护个人的权利。