Voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs) are often plagued by adverse selection problems, because the regulator has imperfect information about firm-specific production technologies and abatement costs. We explore this issue using the UK climate change agreement (CCA) as a case study. First, we present a theoretical emulation of the program. Second, we resolve the regulator’s asymmetric information problem by estimating unobserved energy efficiency using production theory. Third, we use microdata from three confidential manufacturing surveys to empirically test how limited information impacts resource allocation within the scheme. In line with the problem of limited information about firm production technologies, we find that firms with lower levels of energy efficiency receive higher CCA tax discounts. This finding holds over a range of robustness tests.

中文翻译：

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自愿环境协议中的信息不对称：英国气候变化协议的理论和证据

自愿环境协议（VEA）经常受到逆向选择问题的困扰，因为监管机构对特定于公司的生产技术和减排成本的信息不完善。我们以英国气候变化协议（CCA）为例研究此问题。首先，我们给出程序的理论仿真。其次，我们通过使用生产理论估算未观察到的能源效率，解决了监管机构的信息不对称问题。第三，我们使用来自三个机密制造调查的微观数据，以经验方式测试有限的信息如何影响计划内的资源分配。鉴于有关企业生产技术的信息有限的问题，我们发现能效水平较低的企业可以获得较高的CCA税收优惠。