It is often proposed that the unacceptability of a semantically interpretable sentence can be rooted in its meaning. Elaborating on Oshima (in Washio T, et al (eds) New frontiers in artificial intelligence, Springer, Berlin, 2007), we argue that the meaning-driven unacceptability of factive islands must make reference to felicity conditions, and cannot be reduced to the triviality of propositional content. We also observe, again elaborating on Oshima, that the triviality of factive islands need not be logical, but can be relative to a listener’s background assumptions. These findings call for a revision of a prevalent view about meaning-driven unacceptability, according to which unacceptability results from triviality that is both propositional and logical.

中文翻译：

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虚构的岛屿和意义驱动的不可接受性

经常提出，语义上可解释的句子的不可接受性可以源于其含义。关于大岛（在Washio T等人编辑的人工智能的新领域，施普林格，柏林，2007年）中，我们认为，意义驱动的事实性岛屿的不可接受性必须参考适宜性条件，并且不能简化为命题内容的琐碎性。我们还观察到，再次对大岛进行了阐述，事实性岛屿的琐碎性不一定是合乎逻辑的，而是可以与听众的背景假设有关的。这些发现要求对意义驱动的不可接受性的普遍观点进行修订，据此，不可接受性是由命题和逻辑的琐碎性导致的。